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 The Chinese term suzhi is generally translated into English as “quality,” but in fact, the 
English language does not have a single word that adequately conveys the type of “quality” to 
which the term suzhi refers. Suzhi refers specifically to the quality of the human, as opposed to 
the quality of a material, system, or an idea. The evaluation of “human quality” takes into 
account seemingly countless individual qualities of a person, including one’s physical health and 
appearance, psychological health, intellect, mannerisms, socio-economic status, and so on. The 
nuanced criteria under the umbrella of suzhi-evaluation render the term difficult to explain even 
by the Chinese citizens themselves. This thesis explores the concept of suzhi as it has been 
presented in government discourse over the course of the last 40 years of reform. Providing a 
somewhat chronological history of major developmental policies, the thesis illustrates the 
manner in which top-down policy framing of suzhi imbues it with new meaning in the 
imaginations of average citizens as they navigate a rapidly modernizing and internationalizing 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Suzhi: some things just can’t be translated 
 My first encounter with the Chinese term suzhi (素质) occurred in the fall of 2011, in a 
Chinese language course at the University of Kansas. I had spent a year in China during my 
undergraduate studies, though after only a few years of being home, I hadn’t retained even the 
simplest of vocabulary. At KU, we used excellently chosen textbooks for studying the language- 
the vocabulary was (nearly) always up-to-date so we could learn to communicate with ordinary 
Chinese people without sounding like trained robots, calling new friends “comrade” and 
stumbling around trying to use outdated maxims rooted in “Red China.” The textbook we used to 
gain insight into Chinese language and society was appropriately titled “All Things Considered,” 
as its reading exercises (though perhaps simplified in content and presentation) were largely 
taken directly from recent Chinese newspapers and cultural publications, exposing the students 
to a culturally-informed variety of real-life topics. As we muddled through these authentic 
readings in a classroom situated in one of the United States’ most culturally homogenous areas 
under the guidance of an excellent and thoroughly knowledgeable of all-things-China professor, 
the language class was transformed into what seemed like a virtual-reality tour of China- and 
made us feel as if, were we to be suddenly dropped in the middle of Nanjing, we would find 
nothing entirely foreign to grapple with.   
 One morning, as our small class worked through the new vocabulary in the text of 
Chapter 14, Lonesome Child (jimo de haizi/寂寞的孩子), a news article published in 1999 by the 
People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao/ 人民日报), we came across the new vocabulary word suzhi and 
paused to discuss its meaning in English, as was customary when the text seemed ambiguous or 
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used a term in an uncommon way. In this reading, the meaning seemed ambiguous. Within the 
context of warning presumably unaware parents of the new problems faced by urban Chinese 
single-children in the competitive society of the new market economy, the word appeared in the 
sentence: “Parents need to improve their own quality, and learn a bit about aspects of mental 
health.” (jiazhang xuyao tigao zishen suzhi, xuexi yixie guanyu xinli jiankang fangmian de zhishi
家长需要提高自身素质， 学习一些关于心理健康方面的知识).”1 The vocabulary lists in 
each chapter generally provided suitable English counterparts to the meanings expressed in 
Chinese. There were, of course, times when the definition required clarification, or a term in 
Chinese had already undergone some type of semantic change in native discourse and the 
English description no longer conveyed the meaning appropriately. Suzhi was translated in 
English simply as human quality in our vocabulary list, and the concept in English seemed just 
as foreign as the Chinese word in the text.  
 When we paused our reading to further discuss the term’s meaning, the discussion was 
significantly shorter than usual. We asked “What does it actually mean- human quality?” As 
usual, we expected to receive clarification of the meaning from our professor.  As he was a 
native English speaker fluent in Chinese, he was always able to offer more clarification. Having 
toiled through the language learning process himself, he was very good at catching nuances in 
Chinese that English speakers would find difficult to grasp, and his expertise in so many areas of 
Chinese culture, history, and literature made him very adept at simplifying complex cultural 
concepts. This particular term, however, “human quality” elicited a quite different response. This 
time, he paused to think a moment, then laughed a bit and waved his hand in the air, as if to say 
                                                     
1 Chih-p’ing Chou, Yan Xia, and Meow Hui Goh, All Things Considered, (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, 2001), p. 189. 
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“forget about it.” He replied that he didn’t have a better translation or explanation for suzhi’s 
broader meaning. Perhaps he did have a better description, but simply didn’t have the time in a 
single class period to hash it out enough for it to make sense. He said to us, as a final note to 
remember before we moved on with the reading, that “You know, some things just can’t be 
translated. Language is part of culture, and this concept doesn’t really exist in our culture.” 
 In learning a foreign language, especially when learning primarily from mass-produced 
materials like textbooks, it is common to come across words or idiomatic expressions that seem 
so out-of-touch and random that it is nearly impossible to imagine a situation when one might 
actually need to use it in real life. Many such words and phrases do end up slipping through the 
memory cracks into the abyss of forgotten terms, often without ever reappearing in real 
conversation and never being missed. Thinking about that morning’s class on my way home, and 
considering the daunting number of words I needed to memorize in the next 24 hours, it seemed 
rather likely that suzhi might the one from that day’s lesson that would get forgotten. When 
would I ever actually engage in a conversation-outside of my classroom- that would require me 
to so very specifically refer to human quality? Partly because I could not envision a scenario for 
its use, partly because I could not find that term or alternative explanation of it in my older 
Chinese language learning textbooks from years before, and finally because my own professor 
either could not or simply did not attach additional meaning to it to give it any significant value, 
I preemptively agreed to forgive myself for not being able to use it correctly in a sentence if ever 
called to do so.  
 A bit over a year later, in the fall of 2012, I returned to my former host city of Nanjing for 
a second period of two years. In a very short time, I realized that of all the terms that I had 
learned and forgotten, or studied but never fully learned, that foreign-concept-foreign-word suzhi 
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was indeed an extremely relevant term to grasp. On my way to school one morning, just outside 
of my apartment building, I was greeted by a Chinese man as he attempted to sell his “high-
quality” (zhiliang hao/质量好) imported personal care goods. He greeted me that day by saying 
“hello” in English, and I responded similarly and continued on my way. Over the course of the 
next few weeks, I repeatedly crossed paths with the same man, as he stood directly in the path 
from my building to the bus stop each morning. Each time I passed, he would smile and greet me 
with a “hello,” but rather than greet me in Chinese once he learned that I could communicate in 
his native language, he continued to use greeting phrases in English, Japanese, Russian, Korean, 
German, and Spanish. I was not under the impression that he was fluent in these languages, but it 
was clear that he had made efforts to learn the essential phrases to grab the attention of 
passersby.  
 One day, confused by his insistence on greeting me in languages other than Chinese, I 
asked him why he continued on this way. Before asking him, I had assumed that he was either 
trying to show off his international knowledge, or that he was unable to guess my nationality, 
and trying to make me feel comfortable by greeting me in my possible native language. His 
response was not what I had imagined it would be.  
 I spoke to him in Chinese, letting him know that I am an English speaker from the United 
States, but my Chinese was decent enough that he could just talk to me in his own language. He 
responded that, of course, he knew that already, but he chose to greet me in languages other than 
Chinese because “the Chinese people’s suzhi is too low. They can’t be trusted and one should not 
do business with them.” He proceeded to explain that his greetings in other languages were 
meant to reflect his own business ethic- that the “other countries’ people” have morals in 
business, they do not cheat each other, they sell high-quality goods at a fair price, and they treat 
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customers with respect. He believed that by greeting potential customers in languages of people 
with “higher quality” than the Chinese, both he and his product would be received with a greater 
level of respect.  
 In hindsight, the irony in the above encounter is striking: a native-Chinese man was 
consciously attempting to distance himself from (what he understood as) the meta-stereotype of 
Chinese as being greedy and of “low-quality,” yet blocking bike and foot traffic by standing 
directly in a busy city bike-path during morning rush-hour, while peddling mediocre, western 
drugstore-brand beauty products (at several times the average retail price).2 However, the way 
the man used that nearly-forgotten term suzhi was not clear enough to provide me with a 
confident understanding of what is meant by “human quality” in everyday speech. Though at 
first quite unintentionally, the following two years became for me a rather intensive and constant 
lesson in suzhi discourse. From street-side peddlers (getihu/个体户) to taxi drivers, 
construction/migrant workers, teachers and professors, restaurant workers, business elite, 
university students, and Communist Party cadres, I heard countless explanations of suzhi. By 
way of personal anecdotes, thoughtful discussions of individual interpretations, dialogues in 
group conversations, and through casual, spontaneous encounters with the ordinary people of 
Nanjing, as well as people I met as I traveled to a variety of other locations as far away from 
Nanjing as Xinjiang and Sichuan, I gradually developed a much clearer picture of “human 
                                                     
2 As will be seen below, this very behavior is what some point to as an indicator of what is meant by “low-quality.” 
Blocking traffic and disregarding the inconvenience to others by standing in the bike path, peddling goods on the 
street, grossly exaggerating the quality and price of foreign imports for personal profit, and having no storefront 
from which to sell such goods (which implies at least minimal compliance with “quality control” mechanisms of the 
state inspection agencies) - each of these represent, in part, what has been meant by “low suzhi” over the course of 
the last four decades.  
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quality,” as the Chinese see it, in the context of their current, average, every-day lives in the 21st 
century.  
 This thesis explores the concept of suzhi as it has been presented in official discourse 
over the course of the last 40 years of reform. By tracing its evolution from a vaguely defined 
policy goal of the early reform period of the 1970s to its ubiquitous usage in public discourse in a 
variety of social contexts, one may grasp a fuller understanding of what is meant by the modern 
Chinese conception of “human quality” as it is used today against the backdrop of top-down 
modernization and development policy propaganda.  
1.2 Western Scholarship on Suzhi 
 Various attempts by western scholars have been made to identify the performative 
aspects of suzhi discourse in contemporary Chinese society. A large portion of western 
scholarship tends to highlight the negative social influence of suzhi in terms of a social and 
political discourse that promotes economic disparity and social stratification. In identifying the 
connection between suzhi discourse and social inequality, Ann Anagnost argues, through a 
combination of Foucauldian theoretical frameworks on human subjectivity and empirical 
analysis, that the emphasis on improving the “quality” of the population is little more than a 
clever guise behind which lies a neoliberal governmentality- creating self-regulating, consumer 
subjects to further national economic development.3  Pun Ngai and Yan Hairong contribute to 
the neoliberal interpretation of suzhi by highlighting the socio-economic challenges faced by 
rural populations and migrant workers within the urban/rural class dichotomy and within the 
                                                     
3 Ann Anagnost, “The Corporeal Politics of Quality (Suzhi),” Public Culture 16, no. 2, (2004): pp.189-208, DOI: 
10.1215/08992363-16-2-189; “From ‘Class’ to ‘Social Strata': grasping the social totality in reform-era China,” 
Third World Quarterly 29, no. 3, (2008), p.497-519, DOI: 10.1080/01436590801931488.  
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emergent market economy of the late 1990s and early 2000s.4 Hai Ren develops the concept of 
China’s neoliberal transformation in a discussion of the formation of a “middle-class norm” 
based on consumer practices and the social respectability and opportunities for upward mobility 
that come with attaining middle-class status.5 Sun Wanning expands the neoliberal reading of 
suzhi discourse to illustrate that the designation of high or low “quality” not only places rural 
migrants at a competitive disadvantage against the consumer practices of the urban middle-class, 
but also further ascribes lower “quality” to migrants from certain geographical locations, thus 
creating a hierarchical valuation scheme within an already ‘derogated’ segment of the 
population.6 
 Others take a less value-oriented approach by illustrating the nuanced meanings of suzhi 
that ordinary Chinese citizens interpret and act upon in their daily lives, mostly within the 
context of a specific region and demographic. Carolyn Hsu refutes the neoliberal readings of 
suzhi discourse in her research on Harbin, Heilongjiang residents’ perceptions of businesspeople, 
Communist Party cadres, and the developing entrepreneur-mentality at the turn of the 21st 
century. Through the narratives of her study participants, she identifies levels of “quality” as 
being imagined in terms of educational attainment and social responsibility, as opposed to 
                                                     
4 Pun Ngai, “Subsumption or Consumption? The Phantom of Consumer Revolution in "Globalizing" China,” 
Cultural Anthropology 18, no 4, (2003), p.469-492, DOI: 10.1525/can.2003.18.4.469; Yan Hairong, ““What if Your 
Client/Employer Treats Her Dog Better Than She Treats You? Market Militarism and Market Humanism in Post-
socialist Beijing,” In Global Futures in East Asia: Youth, Nation, and the New Economy, edited by Ann Anagnost, 
Andrea Arai, and Hai Ren, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013) p. 150-75; “Neoloiberal governmentality 
and neohumanism: organizing Suzhi/value flow through labor recruitment networks,” Cultural Anthropology 184, 
no. 4, (2003), p.493-523, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3651611. 
5 Hai Ren, “The Middle-Class Norm and Responsible Consumption in China’s Risk Society,” In Global Futures in 
East Asia: Youth, Nation, and the New Economy, edited by Ann Anagnost, Andrea Arai, and Hai Ren, (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2013) p. 29-52; “The Neoliberal State and Risk Society: The Chinese State and the 
Middle Class,” TELOS 151, (2010), p. 105-28, DOI: 10.3817/0610151105. 




neoliberal logics of consumerism.7 Andrew Kipnis provides a geneology of the term suzhi in a 
social, political, and linguistic context, details its transformation within a nature vs. nurture 
connotation, and explicitly dismisses interpretations of suzhi discourse as neoliberal by pointing 
out the over-generalization inherent in neoliberal frameworks of analysis.8 By incorporating the 
theme of “exemplary modelling” discussed by Borge Bakken, who posits that Chinese statecraft 
and social ordering are products of China’s long-standing tradition of learning by imitation, 
Kipnis provides a picture of contradiction and struggle. He argues that official discourse in suzhi-
raising campaigns promotes the cultivation of specific qualities, such as individuality, 
entrepreneurialism, creativity, and self-regulation, yet these very qualities, if successfully 
cultivated, undermine the notion that social stability can be maintained by imitating “exemplary” 
models.9 The preceding scholarship is useful in helping to identify the major themes that are 
represented by the term over the course of the reform-era, but does little to offer insight into how 
the average person internalizes such a nuanced concept in daily life after the first decade of the 
21st century.    
 Within the following chapters, I will provide an understanding of the term suzhi by 
highlighting how it has been used as a framing device for policy implementation throughout the 
reform period. In doing so, I will first introduce the general concept of “human quality” in China 
                                                     
7 Carolyn Hsu, Creating Market Socialism, (Durham:  Duke University Press, 2007); “Cadres, Getihu, And Good 
Businesspeople: Making Sense Of Entrepreneurs In Early Post-Socialist China,” Urban Anthropology and Studies of 
Cultural Systems and World Economic Development 35, no. 1, p. 1-38 ( 2006), Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40553488.  
8 Andrew Kipnis, “Suzhi: A Keyword Approach,” The China Quarterly, no. 186 (2006), p.295-313, Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192614; “Suzhi Reified: Neoliberalism Reified: Suzhi Discourse and Tropes of 
Neoliberalism in the People's Republic of China,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 13, no. 2 
(2007), p.383-400, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4622955. 
9 Borge Bakken, The Exemplary Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Andrew Kipnis, “Subjectification 





and its relation to statecraft in a brief overview of its historical antecedents. Then I will provide a 
somewhat chronological history of the usage of the term suzhi in official discourse throughout 
the Reform Era, from 1979 to the present day, to illustrate the process by which the term has 
evolved from an obscure adjective describing unadorned silk to a comprehensive self-
improvement project and social ideal. Finally, in hopes of supplementing the excellent research 
already available, I will provide an brief discussion of suzhi as it is used by average citizens 
today, nearly 40 years after its modern debut into the public consciousness, to illustrate the 
manner in which top-down policy framing enters the very private consciousness of average 




Chapter Two: Suzhi and Social Engineering in early Post-Mao China 
2.1 Suzhi in Pre-Modern Chinese 
 Suzhi is a nuanced term with virtually no English equivalent. While it is often translated 
simply as “quality” or “human quality,” the term carries many meanings that the English 
translation does not convey.10 Chinese has many terms that may be translated into English as 
“quality,” but in modern discourse, when referring to the aggregate qualities embodied by a 
human being, rather than the quality (and qualities) of an object or an institution, for example, 
only suzhi encapsulates the variegated criteria of the concept of “human quality.” The 
designation of high or low “quality” can refer to a number of individual qualities an individual or 
a group possesses, such as physical quality (strength), mental/psychological quality (intelligence 
and aptitude), moral quality (character), and cultural or civic quality (tastes and etiquette).  
However, the term has only recently gained such nuanced meaning. Prior to the late 20th century, 
suzhi was a rather obscure word and quite unrelated to notions of human development. 
 The graphs su (素) and zhi (质)can be found numerous times in all varieties of classical 
and pre-modern texts. However, the combined graphs only appear a handful of times. The 
majority of occurrences of suzhi appear in relation to inanimate objects, rather than being 
specific to man or society, and although neutral in its connotation, it was often used to describe 
an object or material deserving praise or respect.11  
                                                     
10 In Kipnis, “Keyword,” he counts 32 different English translations of suzhi, referencing the 1999 work of Jiang 
Tong, '"Suzhi jiaoyu' yingyi bianxi" ("An analysis of the English translations of suzhi jiaoyu"), Changjiang zhigong 
daxue xuebao {Journal of the Changjiang Vocational University)16, no. 4 (1999).  
11 When these two graphs are found together, the meaning becomes an unadorned substance or pure substance. 
Though it is only found together on few occasions in extant texts, the consistency of its meaning remains intact 
through the various texts. In describing architecture in the rhapsodies, the beauty of a goddess, the disposition of an 
army, or the visual and structural quality of a person or thing, the implication of being pure, unadorned, natural and 
of solid structure is clear and praiseworthy. For examples, see: Xiao Tong, Wen xuan: or Selections of Refined 
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 Su (素), alone, as defined in the Shuowen jiezi, is plain, unadulterated and unadorned 
white silk.12 As white has been, since ancient times in China, the appropriate color for mourning 
ritual observances, pure, white silk was the silk of choice for such ritual ceremonies. Several 
passages in pre-Qin texts describe the silk worn by ritual practitioners as being su, praising its 
simplicity and the reverence it shows. This simple and unadorned material can also be extended 
in meaning to refer to one’s demeanor or countenance, implying one appears to be unaffected, 
calm, or composed and unfettered. White, unadulterated silk was the material of choice not only 
for mourning attire, but also for the writing medium. Its purity in color and structural integrity 
allowed for an excellent base on which to write. In modern Chinese, along with its ancient 
definition, su also carries an additional meaning of a trait or behavior that is “habitual” or 
“longstanding.” 
 Zhi (質), alone, is defined in the shuowen jiezi as “a thing of collateral exchange,” or 
offering, derived from the practice of offering sacrificial humans and animals in ritual 
ceremonies, but it eventually came to denote the substantiating effect of offering (sacrificing) a 
                                                     
Literature, volume two: Rhapsodies on Sacrifices, Hunting, Travel, Sightseeing, Palaces and Halls, Rivers and Seas, 
He Pingshu, “The Hall of Great Blessings,” trans. David R. Knechtges, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1982) pp. 279-304. Xiao Tong, Wen xuan: or Selections of Refined Literature, volume three: Rhapsodies on Natural 
Phenomena, Birds and Animals, Aspirations and Feelings, Sorrowful Laments, Literature, Music, and Passions, 
Song Yu, “Rhapsody on the Goddess,” trans. David R. Knechtges, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982) 
pp. 339-345. Excerpt from the Han Shu, Historical Narrative section, number 16: “wan shi wei zhi zhou zhang bo di 
shi liu: Mr. Wan of Wei Faces Mr. Zhang of Zhou,” accessed via CHANT.org, on April 11, 2016. URL: 
http://www.chant.org.www2.lib.ku.edu/PreHan/Search.aspx; Excerpt from: The Lost Book of Zhou, “Conquering Jie 
of Yin,” accessed via CHANT.org, on April 11, 2016. URL: 
http://www.chant.org.www2.lib.ku.edu/PreHan/Search.aspx. Excerpt from: Guanzi: Political, Economic, and 
Philosophical Essays from Early China, trans. by W. Allyn Rickett, volume two, chapter 14, section 42, “On Paying 
Attention to Circumstances,” (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998) pp. 129-135. Huinanzi, “Instructions 
on the Original Dao,” section 10, accessed via: the Chinese Text Project, at URL: http://ctext.org/huainanzi/yuan-
dao-xun?searchu=%E7%B4%A0%E8%B3%AA&searchmode=showall#result, on April 12, 2016. 
 
12From the Shuowen jiezi, entry no. 8729 Accessed via Ctext.org, URL http://ctext.org/shuo-wen-jie-zi?searchu=
素 , on April 10, 2016. 
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hostage (usually a prince of a kingdom) as collateral during state negotiations. 13 The graph was 
eventually most often used to mean “substance” or “the natural constituent or quality of a 
thing.”14 The latter usage is more commonly found in texts dated from the Warring States period 
and later, and generally carries this meaning of “substance” when it is paired with another graph 
to form a compound word.  
 When the graphs su and zhi are found together, the meaning becomes an unadorned, pure, 
or innate substance. As the following discussion will show, the concept of man as a moldable, 
useful, and necessary object in the functioning of a stable and prosperous state, will help to 
clarify how the ancient concept of “innate substance” came to mean “human quality” in the 
modern context.  
 
2.2 The Family Planning Policy and suzhi as “Human Quality” 
 The term suzhi in modern discourse, first appeared on a broad scale during the Dengist 
reforms of the late 1970s in a political slogan coinciding with his Reform and Opening (gaige 
kaifang/改革開放) campaign, and the implementation of the newly-conceived family planning 
policy.15 Banners and headlines promoting the need to control the growth of the Chinese 
population began with a simple, catchy slogan that the average citizen could easily understand. 
Through the recent years of devastating famine, social chaos, and political turmoil that resulted 
                                                     
13 Shuowen jiezi, entry number 3952, from the Bei section, accessed via http://ctext.org/shuo-wen-jie-zi?searchu= 
質, through Ctext.org on April 10, 2016. 
14 This meaning is taken from: A Student’s Dictionary of Classical and Medieval Chinese, edited by Paul W. Kroll, 
and offered through the Pleco Android platform. 2015.  
15 Rachel Murphy, “Turning Peasants into Modern Chinese Citizens: “Population Quality” Discourse, Demographic 




from the catastrophic mass campaigns under Mao’s leadership, the Chinese people were acutely 
aware of the industrial and natural resource scarcity facing the country.16 Although within the 
scientific studies preceding and leading to the official promulgation of the Family Planning 
Policy, the concept of “quality” was interchangeably discussed in terms of suzhi and zhiliang, the 
neutrality of suzhi provided a much more flexible application of the idea of overall-quality.17 
Though they have subtle differences in application and connotation, in early population studies 
literature these two terms both conveyed the sense of general, comprehensive quality- though 
over time, suzhi came to represent the aggregate qualities embodied by humans, while zhiliang 
referred to the quality of industries and institutions. “Quality,” the English word that both terms 
(along with several other common terms) are generally translated as, does not adequately convey 
the “aggregate qualities” embedded in the term suzhi- the physical substance, psychological 
capacity, technological aptitude, and social utility- of the individual bodies that made up China’s 
population.  
 The drive to industrialize and modernize the country revealed the overpopulation crisis, 
which would inevitably affect individual families and their prospects for success in the new 
market. In early 1979, the central government officially announced the nationwide Family 
Planning Policy, which dictated that urban residents would be limited to one child, and rural 
residents and minority populations would be limited to two children (if the first born happened to 
be a female).18 The policy announcement, in customary fashion, was promptly promoted across 
newspaper headlines and public announcement board through a concise and enthusiastic slogan.  
                                                     
16 Ann Anagnost, “From ‘Class’ to ‘Social Strata’: grasping the social totality in reform-era China” Third World 
Quarterly, 29, no. 3 (2008): 497-519. Accessed on 11/7/2014. DOI: 10.1080/01436590801931488. 
17 Andrew Kipnis, “Suzhi: A Keyword Approach,” The China Quarterly, no. 186 (2006) pp. 298-99. 
18 Ezra Vogel, p. 688. March 23, 1979, official announcement of the birth control policy (p.687). 
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 The slogan that became the driving factor in gaining eventual wide-spread support of the 
One-Child Policy read: “control the population growth, raise the population quality” (kongzhi 
renkou zengzhang, tigao renkou suzhi/控制人口增长， 提高人口素质), or for short, “decrease 
in quantity, increase in quality.” 19 The implication here was clear that with fewer people to 
compete for scarce resources, access to education, employment, nutritious foods, housing 
options, health care, and other necessities would be more readily available to facilitate the 
healthy development of the physical being. 
 Although already by the early 1950s Women’s League members were charged with 
counseling and educating women about methods of birth control, benefits of delayed marriage 
and planned pregnancies, and essential education regarding overall reproductive health, the 
1970s policy demanded strict enforcement by authorities above the Women’s League cadres, 
giving it the force of law.20 To facilitate the implementation of the Family Planning program, 
authorities were called to strictly enforce the birth rates within their respective communities.  
Personal hygiene and physical health were included in the educational training, helping to foster 
public awareness of the connection between the overall health of the physical body and the 
quality of the child. 
 Suzhi, on the eve of major economic and social transformations of the late 1970s, was 
generally regarded as an innate, and mostly physical quality that could be enhanced by proper 
                                                     
Reiteration of the need for increased enforcement of family-planning efforts by all levels of administration in 1981 
(Vogel，p. 688)  
19 Patricia M. Thornton, “From liberating production to unleashing consumption: mapping landscapes of power in 
Beijing” Political Geography 29 (2010) 302-310. Accessed on 10/12/2014. DOI: 10.1016/polgeo.2010.06.001 
20 Law and Policy are generally considered two distinctly different things, but in Communist-led China, the two are 
often interchanged and the distinctions muddied. Laws are codified though sometimes ignored or difficult to enforce 
due to structural and social aspects of the legal system. Policies are pronouncements by leading officials, and are 
given priority often much more dutifully than laws. Failure to comply with policies has legal ramifications and are 
often more strictly carried out because of their explicit connection to party/political priorities.  
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access to life’s basic necessities. The prevailing collectivist mindset of the time provided the 
understanding that the health and stability of the nation depended upon the fostering of 
physically and psychologically healthy children- in carefully limited numbers. The notion of 
‘human quality’ rested upon a simple comprehension of Darwinian concepts of evolution and 
Malthusian theory- if China was to survive, and the Chinese people were to flourish among the 
people of the world, they must strive to raise the quality of the ‘innate substance’ of the people of 
their nation through limiting population growth and enhancing the availability of “life-
improving” resources. 
 
2.3: “Human Quality” and Related Concepts prior to 1979’s Suzhi 
 Well before the term suzhi entered modern public discourse, concerns about the deficient 
qualities，the general characteristics in need of guidance and improvement，of the Chinese 
people were popular topics of discussion among China’s elite. While a handful of western suzhi-
discourse analysts consider the hierarchical valuation of man based on a ranking of individual 
qualities to be “dehumanizing,” China’s practice of doing just that for the entirety of its recorded 
history is, in fact, exceptionally focused on the human- particularly, how to become more 
perfectly human.21  
 Dating back to the formative years of classical Chinese philosophy, particularly during 
the warring states period of China’s history, members of the shi (士) class and prominent 
followers of the more highly developed philosophical schools attempted to organize the human 
                                                     
21 For a concise discussion on the concept of man’s becoming “whole” (cheng/诚) in terms of realizing his full 
potential, see Graham, Disputers of the Tao, pp. 133-37. 
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realm by explaining man’s nature, identifying his inherent deficiencies, and assigning social rank 
based on preconceived standards of quality that were grounded in moral psychology and social 
utility. The aim, at this time in history, was to reduce the chaos and strife experienced by all 
levels of society resulting from constant warfare and hegemonic ambitions of various states. 
Though the impetus of the rise of philosophical writings on these subjects was to direct kingly 
rule over the people, the underlying messages applied to the individual at the lowest level and 
extended to the ruling elite. The overarching goal of the various philosophical schools of the time 
was to enhance the state by enhancing the condition of society through reformed thought and 
behavioral practices of all individuals.  From ritual sacrifices, daily dress, musical preferences, 
and personal behavior, early thinkers sought to harmonize society and provide a replicable 
framework for social stability, urging individuals to improve themselves for the sake of “all 
under heaven” (tianxia/天下). The Confucians hoped to achieve order by promoting ethical 
behavior through constant learning, self-rectification and self-cultivation, restricting desires and 
regulating emotion, and by ritually adhering to propriety defined within hierarchically ranked 
social relationships. 
 In the modern era of the Chinese state, determining the most effective method of ordering 
and harmonizing the multitudinous peoples of the state into a cohesive and productive whole still 
remains a prevalent discussion, though expressed in terms more fitting to the modern ideological 
and political scheme. The question of how to enhance the prosperity of the state, the knowledge 
that harmony and stability among the people rests on the mundane behaviors of the individual, 
has been a consistently pressing concern for China’s ruling elite- from the advent of agricultural 
communities in pre-classical times, to the overthrow of Imperial rule, to the present day.  
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 As will be discussed in Chapter five, the contemporary interpretation of the term suzhi 
carries with it many of the fundamental concerns that were the foundation of the prominent pre-
classical philosophical teachings; namely, self-cultivation, proper public and private behavior, 
appropriate adornment of one’s physical person, enhancement of individual skills/abilities, social 
stability, and collective harmonious progress.22 
 The concept of cultivation of the self- be it in terms of morality, ways of dressing and 
personal comportment, the development of skillsets and cognitive aptitude for the betterment of 
self and state- was a fundamental theme in early Chinese thought. Though these ideas are now 
inherent to and embedded in the term suzhi, in pre-classical times, these ideas were expressed 
through a variety of terms, each related to the betterment of the human, and seen as measures of 
one’s value in society. The terms briefly discussed below, in this context, relate most often to the 
human, as opposed to the other living things. More specifically, the terms in this discussion each 
share two distinctive commonalities: first, each was believed to be innate to the human being; 
that is, each human was/is inherently endowed with some degree of each of these simply by 
virtue of being born human; and second, each of these things were considered to be things that 
people needed to, or at least could, improve upon, regulate, and/or cultivate to become better or 
more fully perfected humans in the social world. These two similarities are also key features of 
the modern concept of suzhi. The terms briefly discussed here are: de (德), xing (性), qing (情), 
and cai (才/材).  
De (德) Man’s Innate Moral Power 
                                                     
22 The sources here are too numerous to list. However, for a few excellent overviews of early philosophical 
concerns, see: A.C. Graham’s Disputers of the Tao; Sarah Allan’s The way of Water and Sprouts of Virtue, Phillip J. 
Ivanhoe’s Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy; P.J. Ivanhoe’s Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation, and Wing-
Tsit Chan’s A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. 
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 De (德), like suzhi today, is a rather problematic word in terms of English translation and 
concrete meaning. Evidence of its usage, or some closely related form of it, dates back to the 
Oracle Bone inscriptions of the late Shang dynasty.23 Its usage and meaning varied depending on 
time and context, but has been taken to mean “virtue” in its simplest translation, as in the 
“inherent characteristic of something,” or as a moral-laden term meaning “inherent virtuousness” 
which, in either case, gave an individual a certain amount of sway or power over others 
depending on the amount of de he had. 24 De was believed to be an inherited trait, passed down 
through one’s lineage, built or depleted over time, and could be enhanced by certain ethical 
behaviors.  
 The Confucians, primarily, took de to be the manifest power of one’s inborn moral virtue. 
This version of de needed to be cultivated and built upon in order for a man to become a junzi     
(君子), a gentleman, or a man of noble character, eligible to hold an official position in the state 
apparatus and have a chance of upward social mobility. De was said to have a certain power over 
others, generating a genuine yet imperceptible influence on others.  
 Furthermore, as an important component in creating harmony among men, de contained a 
force generating reciprocity. When one acted with de, the reciprocated action would also be one 
of de. Cultivating de required the constant effort of self-rectification, perfecting both the ritual 
acts of sacrifice and the ritual acts of propriety in all mundane behaviors, being filial and sincere, 
and devoting oneself to learning the correct way of social conduct. Thus, de was a naturally 
endowed element of the human, but in the Confucian perspective, especially as the Ruist school 
                                                     
23 Sarah Allan, The Way of Water and Sprouts of Virtue, “The Sprouts of Virtue,” (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1997) pp.101-106. 
24 Ibid.  
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developed through Mencius’ and Xunzi’s expansions, de came to carry an inextricable 
connotation of morality-as-virtue, and thereby became an integral and inseparable part of the 
Confucian ethical code. 
Xing (性) 
 Along with de, man was thought to be born with both a mind/heart (xin/心) and a nature.  
Xing (性) is the combination of feeling and thinking and the natural inclinations of the human. In 
the early philosophies, it was not disputed that man had an inherent nature that differed from the 
nature of other living things, and this was due to his having the mind/heart (xin), which other 
species did not have. The Analects of Confucius state that men have similar natures, but as men 
grow, their practices differentiate them one from another.25 Whether one’s nature was inclined 
towards goodness or otherwise depended fully on the cultivation of one’s character, and the 
surroundings in which one found himself. Thus, according to Confucian orthodoxy, man’s nature 
could be improved upon through diligent practice. It must be guided and nourished in order to 
flourish to its full potential, and thus be of value within the social order.26  
Qing (情) 
 Related to man’s nature, and very much embedded in it, is man’s innate disposition, his 
qing (情). In early philosophical discourse, man’s qing was considered to be inextricably related 
to his nature, but distinguished each individual by the outward expression of his innate 
disposition. Dispositions, sometimes translated as emotions, were also naturally endowed in the 
                                                     
25 Analects 17.2, “The Master said: the natures of man are similar, it is practice/habit which differentiates them (zi 
yue: xing xiangjin ye, xi xiang yuan ye).  
26 The well-known debate between Mencius and Xunzi regarding the nature of man will not be discussed here, as it 
is beyond the scope of this paper. For a brief discussion of xing, see Sarah Allan’s The Way of Water, pp. 107-111 
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human, were considered part of the natural order, and thus, neutrally viewed. Anger, joy, 
jealousy, frustration, sadness, and desire were all inherent in qing, natural to man’s being human, 
but were, according to the Confucians, necessarily in want of cultivation and rectification or 
regulation.27 To clarify the difference between xing and qing, man’s xing automatically endows 
him with his individual parameters of qing, and his expression of qing determines his character 
as discerned by others. Because man’s nature (his xing) was thought to be generally predisposed 
toward excess, without careful regulation of his qing, the excess of any of the forms of qing 
could destabilize both his internal and external environment, disrupting the social harmony and 
inviting similar reciprocation.  
Cai (才/材) 
 Finally, though these concepts are not at all exhaustive of pre-classical terminology used 
to describe inherent endowments of the human category, the last term discussed here is cai (才/
材). This term referred to the natural abilities endowed in man, the skills and potential 
capabilities of the human not yet taken shape or cultivated. Cai, originally a term for timber or 
the shoots of plants ready to grow, was used metaphorically to refer to man’s abilities that could 
be put to use in the social realm.28 In the Confucian tradition, an individual’s cai was to be 
carefully cultivated and trained in order to make him both useful and refined in society. As with 
de, xing, and qing, cai was also inborn and inherent in humans, but, like de, was not equally 
distributed among men- some were endowed with very little potential, while others were born 
with extraordinary aptitude, though all would need to cultivate what he had in order to realize its 
                                                     
27 Michael Puett, “The Ethics of Responding Properly: The Notion of qing in early Chinese Thought,” in Love and 
Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature, edited by Halvor Eifring, (Leiden: Brill, 2004) Pages 37-68. 
28 Allan, The Way of Water, “The Sprouts of Virtue,” pp. 111-113. 
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measure. In order for an individual’s cai, or potential to be useful, it needed to be nourished, just 
as a seedling growing in a field must be watered and tended. This nourishment came in the form 
of self-cultivation, rigorous attention to ritual and duty, and from the process of education from a 
proper model or teacher. Left unattended, one’s cai could perish, or grow into an unwieldy and 
socially useless form. In short, one’s usefulness within the state necessarily required the attentive 
cultivation of one’s individual potential. Inadequate cultivation of individual skill rendered one 
unfit to participate in the social order of men.  
 Although each of the terms discussed above originally denoted concepts now contained 
within the modern use of the term suzhi, each of them was relatively value-neutral at some point 
in the early Chinese lexicon. Although rooted in naturalistic or organic phenomena, their 
evolution and adoption/co-optation into Confucian philosophical rhetoric rendered them 
unsuitable for Communist leadership usage, as the new government attempted to build a new 
society while distancing themselves from the old social order.  
 None of the terms remained value-neutral past the Han codification of Confucian learning 
(202 to 220 CE), and each term and its numerous viable applications were tainted by the 
association with the “feudal Confucian past”- the very historical memory that the Communist 
regime sought to eradicate from the minds of the Chinese people after 1949. The terms de, xing, 
qing, and cai were not purged from the Chinese language, and are very much in use today to 
describe similar concepts as they had in the past. However, as state-building rhetoric of the 
Communist regime required disassociation from the historical ideology of imperial China, these 
terms were not to be used as official terminology.   
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Chapter Three: Modernizing the Nation and Raising the Quality of the People  
3.1 Early Twentieth Century Concerns 
  In the final years of the Qing dynasty, reform-minded intellectuals united through 
a belief that the people of Qing China lacked the fundamental characteristics/qualities needed for 
a modern society. Influential literati insisted that the people had become “physically and 
mentally weak” and needed more than machinery and infrastructure to modernize- they needed 
more people “dedicated to perform” instead of shirking hard work, and they needed to reduce the 
pervasive “ignorance of the people” in terms of modern social ideas and scientific 
development.29 Though most often grounded in hope, calls for the “moral renovation of the 
people” and the crisis of the “quality of the citizenry” (rendered as renpin/ 人品) being the main 
hindrance to the establishment of a constitutional government were growing louder beyond the 
confines of the Qing court.30  
 After the fall of the Qing dynasty, the majority of the Chinese population was rural, 
accustomed to their small networks of local relationships and local customs. Over the course of 
the first few decades of the 20th century, various Chinese thinkers and activists sought to bring 
opportunity and education to China’s vast rural population. Among them was a western-trained 
scholar named James Yen, who returned to China from the United States in the 1920s to put his 
scientific education to work for the Republic. Seeking to raise the quality of the rural people, 
Yen and his team of researchers established the first of several “Rural Reconstruction” research 
sites, known as the “Ding Xian Experiments.” Through western methods of scientific research, 
                                                     
29 Zeng Guofan, “Letter to his Younger Brothers,” (tr. Janice Wickieri), Renditions, nos. 41-42 (1994), pp. 135-36; 
The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection, 3rd edition, edited by Janet Chen, et al., (New York: 
W.W. Norton & co.,, 2014), p. 128. 
30 Catherine Vance Yeh, The Chinese Political Novel, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), pp. 166-175. 
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fieldwork, and data collection, Yen’s team determined that rural life perpetuated “four 
fundamental weaknesses” in the largest segment of China’s population at that time. The 
weaknesses plaguing the people were: “ignorance, poverty, disease, and civic disintegration.”31 
Reconstruction of the rural life was not purely an altruistic endeavor to help raise the rural 
people’s standard of living, the weaknesses of the rural were not isolated to the rural areas. As a 
nation, the weaknesses of the rural people were seen as detriments to the progress and 
preservation of the entire nation.32  
 Republican China grew deeply fascinated with the developed sciences of the western 
nations. Many of the intellectual and political elite of the Republican era had spent time abroad, 
learning and adapting western scientific information to benefit the new nation. By the 1930s, 
national development discourse revolved around the scientific, from infrastructure design and 
governmental procedure, to education and social engineering, each was done through careful 
consideration of the most up-to-date scientific research. 
 In the name of science and development, and couched in terms of racial improvement 
(renzhong gailiang/人种改良), elites of the Republican era sought to transform the Chinese from 
a backward people into a “strong and forward-looking nation-state.”33 Chiang Kai-Shek’s 
Confucian-morality and modernity-driven “New Life Movement” of the mid-1930s sought to 
reinvigorate some of the Confucian ethical code in order to bring a modicum of stability and 
harmony to the disparate masses. Western and scientifically trained intellectuals realized that in 
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order for the transformation of mores among the throngs of uncultured citizens to succeed, 
however, the fundamental qualities of China’s enormous rural population needed to be improved. 
 Raising the comprehensive quality of the rural population coincided with other 
Republican-era population concerns. Western eugenic science, theories of genetic degradation 
and racial impurity, Social Darwinism, and similar race-science had found an eager pupil in the 
Republic of China. As the new government pressed its ideology of racial harmony as its 
legitimizing basis for political control of the nation, some within the intellectual circles of 
population studies and sociology fascinated themselves with methods to ensure that the Chinese 
race would progressively generate more scientifically superior specimen than was seen in the 
current sample.34 The scientific approach to population studies during China’s Republican years 
laid the groundwork for the population control policies and suzhi-raising campaigns of 
Communist China nearly half a century later. 
 
3.2 Economic Reforms and Raising Suzhi 
 At the outset of the Reform and Opening policy, the logic put forth in propaganda and 
policy direction equated raising suzhi with liberating the economy and raising individual levels 
of income. Coinciding with the hard roll-out of the Family Planning policy, the economic 
reforms initiated in the early 1980s sought to bring the country out of backwardness by 
stimulating economic growth through liberated production mechanisms. However, exactly what 
suzhi meant- what it measured and how one might get it- had not yet been officially explained. 
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The people were left to piece together a definition of “quality” that made sense in the current 
political and economic climate. The idea that the national population was somehow suzhi-
deficient and needed improvement combined with the national drive to modernize through 
economic liberation to set in motion the evolving understanding of what “quality” meant. The 
logical connection between suzhi and economic success took root in the early years of Reform. 
           By autumn of 1980, the careful and gradual process of transitioning from a planned 
economy to a semi-market economy began to take visible shape informed, in part, by the 
successful results of the implementation of the Rural Agricultural Reform. Shortly after Mao’s 
death in 1976, intra-party criticism of many of Mao’s policies had already begun to circulate, and 
a consensus among the reform-minded faction of the Party/State leaders was that the gravest of 
Mao’s errors needed immediate rectification, lest the country slide even further backwards. The 
massive agricultural collectives, created during the 1950s Great Leap Forward, were widely held 
to be the direct cause of the crippling nationwide grain shortages, which ultimately led to 
widespread famine and the deaths by starvation of an estimated 30 million people. By 1977, two 
decades after the end of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, poverty and starvation in the countryside 
were still rampant. Deng Xiaoping, along with Wan Li and Zhao Ziyang, determined to discover 
a solution to this problem, much in the same way that James Yen had done in the 1930s.  
  Between 1977 and 1979, Wan Li took it upon himself to perform several weeks of 
ground-level research in the most impoverished areas of Anhui, while Zhao Ziyang 
simultaneously carried out his own research of a similar nature in the communes of Sichuan’s 
countryside. While Wan Li scientifically recorded his observations and developed a detailed 6-
point proposal to alleviate the problem of starvation among Anhui peasants, Zhao covertly 
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implemented “decollectivization” experiments within the communes of Sichuan.35  The results of 
their fieldwork proved to Deng and several other decision-makers that gradual decollectivization 
of the rural communes was imperative for the modernization and development of the countryside 
and the first step towards national economic restructuring.36  
           The initial phase of official decollectivization came in the form of a program of 
“Contracting Down to the Household” within farming collectives. This program allowed the 
farmers themselves to determine their own preferred methods of crop cultivation, and was based 
on a mutually agreed upon contract of exchange. Housing and farming machinery were provided 
in exchange for a certain quota of the harvested crop. Whatever crop remained after remittance 
of the quota now belonged solely to the farmer, free to use it to feed his family, or sell it for 
personal profit in the local market. Not only did the program prove fully successful in 
revitalizing grain production and ending the widespread starvation deaths, but within only four 
years of implementation, the average annual income of the peasant-farmers had nearly doubled.37 
By 1982, the farming communes were officially abolished. 
          The success of decollectivization and the marked increase in living standards of farmers 
led to the next phase in economic restructuring and the beginning of the “Dual-track economy.” 
Former collective-run workshops and commune commercial stores, which had been created to 
support the local communes, were transferred to the newly-established township and village-
level authorities as Township and Village Enterprises (TVE). These workshops were now 
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36 Ibid, pp. 691-700. 
37 Ibid, pp.700-704. 
27 
 
allowed to produce goods within their specializations to compete in the market alongside the 
centrally-controlled State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). 
        Throughout the 1980s, increasing outside investment in TVEs, mainly coming from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas Chinese, provided the TVEs with a significant edge in 
industrial production, gradually reducing the competitive strength of the SOEs with similar 
specializations. Although TVEs were not fully private enterprises, their autonomy in overall 
enterprise management provided a much-needed boost in output capability, material and supply 
procurement, and could adjust their level of production based on market demand, thus 
significantly cutting unnecessary expenditures.38 
      By the second-half of the 1980s, the weakening of SOEs led to difficulties in fulfilling the 
welfare structure within SOE system, resulting in largescale layoffs and unemployment in the 
urban areas. To help alleviate the economic and social unrest following in the wake of this 
restructuring process, private small businesses (getihu), based on the precedent set by the 
contracted-household farmers’ initial market success, were formally legalized to practice 
business outside the planned-economic structure. The legalization of private entrepreneurship 
was to allow citizens the chance to engage in the market “to provide a few goods and services to 
increase the quality of life.”39  
         That it was precisely the peasants, the “uneducated, backward, and uncultured” people of 
rural China who initially benefited from and were publically lauded for private entrepreneurship 
gave rise to the subsequent (and relatively short-lived) ill-regard for privately-run businesses in 
the following years. After all, it was primarily the rural Chinese whose low-suzhi was 
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purportedly holding the country back, and their “rural” consciousness could not simply be erased 
by having “gotten rich.”40 The establishment of private business initially met with murmurs 
among the urbanites as something shameful and indicative of failure within the socialist 
system.41 The concept of lacking suzhi, as it was presented by the central government, indicated 
that it was primarily the rural population who needed their quality raised, so how did the term 
relate to the urban population? The division between rural and urban that was embedded in the 
early poverty reduction policies shaped the urban understanding of suzhi as something that 
tacitly elevated the urban individual’s status and separated the two groups into two distinct 
societies operating under entirely different conditions, norms, and expectations.  
3.3 Privatization of “lesser” SOEs 
        In response to the crippling effects of the increasingly successful TVEs operating alongside 
the State sector, and to speed up the momentum of the Four Modernizations, the central 
government determined that a large portion of smaller SOEs should be either shut down or, in 
most cases, transferred to (quasi) private or joint-ownership. This process posed many benefits to 
the state, though the transition would upend certain stabilizing mechanisms on which the people 
had come to depend. In the transition from a socialist-planned to market economy, the 
justification for the transfer of state enterprises to private ownership would not only relieve the 
state of the significant financial burden of providing social welfare for the staggeringly high 
number of state employees, but would also allow for greater, much needed improvements in 
critical industries through competition in an open market.  
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        The transfer of authority of SOEs was gradual in scope and speed, and its effects were 
neither immediately nor equally felt throughout the regions. The restructuring policies, in terms 
of reducing state expenditures on public welfare, were successful and timely as the Asian 
Financial Crisis threatened China’s primary goal of economic development in the second-half of 
the 1990s. However, still in the relatively early stages of Opening and Reform, very few among 
the masses, who would purportedly be the beneficiaries of structural reforms, had the capital or 
expertise necessary to successfully take on such large enterprises. As a result, the 
leadership/ownership of a large portion of State Enterprises transferred hands within and among 
the Party elite. 
 In the people’s eyes, SOE privatization simply transferred the burden of the state onto the 
shoulders of the ordinary people. They no longer had the promise of stable employment, they 
lost significant benefits in health care, food supply and other subsidies, and many were forced 
out of their dependable housing in the work unit living quarters. In many respects, the people not 
only felt abandoned by the state, left to fend for themselves in a seemingly unpredictable new 
economic and political environment, but also developed a substantial distrust in the Party’s 
loyalty to its own ideology.42  
 Corruption and various abuses of power within the ranks of Party cadres were already 
major points of contention among the Chinese people in earlier years of the reform period. Such 
grievances were voiced loudly in the demonstrations throughout the late 1980s, culminating most 
intensely during the student-led demonstrations at Tiananmen Square, from mid-April through 
June 4th of 1989.43 However, as more and more Party members “inherited” positions of power 
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and consequently amassed enormous wealth in the newly-private sector, their blatant displays of 
wealth, power, extravagance, and wastefulness redoubled ordinary citizens’ doubts regarding the 
Party’s loyalty to socialist ideals and their determination (or ability) to perform their role as 
vanguard of the people.44  
 During the process of privatization in the late 1990s, however, many common people 
were not  well-informed of the nuances of the privatization reform policy, or what ‘transfer of 
ownership’ to the private sector entailed, and mistakenly believed that the large enterprises, some 
of which were now run by Party members, were still, in most respects, extensions of the State 
structure. With this assumption in mind, as people witnessed the large-scale layoffs of 
employees, which were in fact necessary to keep such enterprises afloat in the competitive 
market, they saw a betrayal of socialist ideals in exchange for private gain. According to the 
official guiding principles since the founding of the People’s Republic, the Party was responsible 
for supporting the masses through selfless labor, providing necessities in exchange for building 
up the productive forces of society. Now acting as executives in accordance with the “laws of the 
market,” though simultaneously maintaining active or nominal Communist Party membership, 
these cadre-turned-businessmen got rich, yet provided nothing to benefit society according to 
socialist ideology.45  
 Beyond the perceived dereliction of duty to serve the masses as representatives of the 
socialist ideals, another factor existed to raise the ire of the public: it was well-known that prior 
to Deng Xiaoping’s initiation of Reform and Opening, the vast majority of officials within the 
leadership lacked formal education. Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, qualifications for positions 
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and promotions within the Party/state apparatus were based on devotion to political ideology and 
military performance. Formal education, historical, international, technical, or cultural 
knowledge was not a criterion for rising in rank; in fact, education of these sorts, at times under 
the previous leadership, posed an insurmountable obstacle to joining the regime. Desire to 
expand the pool of better-educated party members was one of the driving forces behind policies 
such as the Four Modernizations and the 1986 Compulsory Education Law. 46 
 These factors worked to further shift the public’s understanding of suzhi: wealth, and/or 
power did not unequivocally equate to high-suzhi. Some of the newly-rich were not current or 
former cadres or state bureaucrats, but they were (presumed to be) peasant-farmers profiting 
themselves through selling goods and food at high prices, and they provided nothing for the 
betterment of society beyond their own families. They simply “moved goods from here to 
there.”47 They did not have education in a formal sense, and they did not have culture in the 
modern or traditional sense. What they possessed was a street-savvy ability to negotiate and 
maneuver in the new terrain- the same skills required for thieves and con-artists. 
 The cadre-businessmen did not possess any particularly admirable skillset either. Though 
they now had money, through which they held considerable sway within the world of Chinese 
private business, and they had advantageous personal connections to other high-level cadres, 
cadres-turned-businessmen, and government insiders, they lacked refinement of character, basic 
education, and even seemed to disregard the honorable virtue of loyalty to anyone but 
                                                     
46 In 1986, the central government enacted the compulsory education law, providing 9 years of schooling as the 
minimum standard for all citizens, partly in response to the low education of cadres. According to the CCP Central 
Committee, “raising the suzhi [of the people] is the basic goal of education reform.” Beyond that, the need to raise 
the educational level of all current and future cadres required current cadres who did not have the equivalent of 9 
years of schooling to attend training courses and pass exams in order to maintain their positions. Guojia jiaoyu 
weiyuanhui (ed.), Shiyijie san zhong quanhui yilai zhongyao jiaoyu wenxian (Important Documents on Education 
since the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress) (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1992), p. 182. 
47 Hsu, “Cadres, Getihu, and Good Businesspeople,” p. 16. 
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themselves and their possible benefactors. These people, and those who managed to gain their 
good favor, had the kind of economic capital that was requisite for supporting the construction of 
a consumer society. They could afford the expensive name-brand clothes and foreign, higher-
quality goods. They had the means to purchase cars and new homes as these also became 
commodified. But they only had the material markers of quality in the new socialist market 
economy. However persuasive the propaganda effort to equate material wealth with raising 
individual quality had been, the urban public found this simplistic equation to be lacking in the 
respect that so far, the economic benefits of suzhi-raising projects applied primarily to the 
“backward” rural peasant or the politically affiliated members of society. There was a logical 
disconnect for the urban, politically unaffiliated people which led many to search for more 
applicable and actionable definitions or markers of “quality” in the urban-commoner context.  
 The ability to earn money alone was not enough to earn respect. As urban citizens 
discussed the differences between “good businesspeople” and lowly “private businesspeople,” 
they clarified that suzhi, in their interpretation, contained qualities of cultivated humanity. 
Respect attributed to one’s “high-quality” was reserved for those who had a “refinement” of 
character, visible in manners of speech and dress, and were somehow using their business 
endeavors to facilitate national development through their knowledge of science and technology, 
foreign language skills, and cultural knowledge. Informed by the rhetoric behind the Four 
Modernizations goals which stated that “Without the rapid development of science and 
technology, there can be no rapid development of the economy,” the popular imagining of suzhi 
incorporated the lofty scientific goals found in government propaganda with the traditional 
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mores associated with the educated elite of Confucian literati.48  This kind of behavioral 
refinement and scientific expertise was gained primarily through formal (and advanced) 
education.49  
 For Chinese attempting to internalize the new national catch-phrase of suzhi, by the end 
of the 20th century, the term’s meaning had expanded from a rather vague concept associated 
with top-down rural development projects, economic restructuring, and family planning goals to 
a self-cultivation project applicable to each individual. Relying on deeply-rooted traditions of 
respect for self-improvement through education, urbanites internalized the concept of raising 
quality as a means to meaningfully participate in the national development project and 
simultaneously enhance their own lives. At this time, however, education and the suzhi it could 
bring were still very much embedded in the market-based elements of the modernization project. 
The cultivation of “quality” through education and character refinement promised success and 
respect in the market, which would in turn provide the means for a comfortable, respectable, and 
stable position in society and the purchasing power to obtain quality goods commensurate with 
high- suzhi living standards.  
3.4 Creating a “Quality” Consumer Society 
 Despite the general rise in domestic production and export capacity during the first 
decade of reforms, in order to raise the standard of living significantly enough to justify further 
reforms, China’s leaders recognized the need to transform the traditionally frugal masses into a 
population of consumers. The decade-long influx of outside investment and the cheap labor 
                                                     
48 Deng, Xiaoping. Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the National Conference on Science. IN Selected Works of 
Deng Xiaoping, Volume II, (1984). Beijing: Foreign Language Press, pp. 98-111. 
49 Hsu, Creating Market Socialism, pp.157-62. 
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provided by China’s massive labor force, and the rise in successful and productive TVEs and 
small businesses competing in the market structure, left early 1990s China with a surplus of 
goods and too few international buyers. By the mid-1990s, the government initiated a 
propaganda campaign promoting consumer/leisure spending as a matter of pride and 
development. Employing the sense of national duty alongside the public’s growing appreciation 
of individual wealth and its ability to satisfy material desires, the policies of the second half of 
the 1990s concretized the association of suzhi with educational attainment, cultural 
sophistication, accumulated wealth and personal leisure, thereby equating commodity 
expenditure with “quality” citizenship.  
 One of the ways in which the government “rewarded” the people’s hard work and 
simultaneously promoted the reversal in traditional frugality, in accordance with the successful 
models of modernized western societies, was to mandate a reduction in working hours for the 
(primarily urban, white-collar) working class.  In May, 1995, the central government officially 
introduced the 40-hour work-week (da zhoumo/大周末), in order to create a two-day weekend 
for employees of private and government enterprises. The initiative was promoted by state-run 
news outlets nationwide as a means for the people to enjoy their hard-earned money by having 
leisure time to “travel, shop, and enjoy a restaurant meal.”50 The reception among the masses 
was well-received: local markets, large department stores, restaurants, museums, and all varieties 
of entertainment venues were met with throngs of customers eagerly ready to physically and 
materially enjoy the fruits of their labor. Of course, not all enterprises/businesses readily 
complied with the new policy, but by the end of the 1990s, a large portion of the urban 
                                                     
50 Pun Ngai, “Subsumption or Consumption? The Phantom of Consumer Revolution in "Globalizing" China,” 
Cultural Anthropology 18, no 4, (2003), p.471. 
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population came to expect two days per week of personal time, during which they could pursue 
their own ideal of “the good life.”  
 A successful rise in consumerism resulting from the da zhoumo policy led the central 
government to further the potentiality of increased commodity and leisure expenditure by 
introducing a second round of reforms, to the delight of the public from all industries and social 
strata, as well as for the benefit of the national treasury. Prior to the 1997 revision51, two of the 
officially recognized national holidays, the May 1st International Labor Day, and the October 1st 
Founders’ Day (the holiday commemorating the founding of the People’s Republic of China by 
the Communist Party) were one-day, paid holidays. These two holidays were now extended to 
seven-day holidays, referred to by the party and official news outlets (during the first few years 
of implementation, at least) as “Golden Consumer Days” or “Golden Travel Holidays.”52 The 
extension of paid and unpaid holiday time from one day to seven, sometimes with an additional 
few days off due to the work-free weekends before and after the official holiday dates, was 
intended to facilitate even greater increases in consumer spending.53 The biannual “Golden 
Weeks,” as the term was later shortened to in public discourse, were promoted as “national travel 
holidays” in which domestic tourism would play a crucial role in generating revenue for the 
nation.54 Already by the year 2000, Pun Ngai cites official statistics indicating domestic travel 
                                                     
51 Some accounts put the official launching of this reform as taking place in 1999, though other sources indicate 
1997 as the official declaration of the changes. 
52 Ngai, pp. 471-72. 
53 The official policy mandates that workers be given 7 consecutive days off, but not that all 5 workdays be paid-
time-off. Often, up to 3 days are paid holidays, while the remaining days taken for holiday are unpaid. Furthermore, 
in order to reclaim lost revenue cause by the extended hiatus of workers, it has become customary for some of the 
holiday days to be made up over the weekends before and/or after the “Golden Week” holidays. 
54 The May 1st Labor Day “Golden Week” was eventually reverted, in 2007, to one day or an extended weekend 
with one day paid-time-off, in order to curb the increasingly unmanageable burden on domestic transit systems, as 
well as to alleviate the financial and administrative mess incurred by businesses and institutions which deal 
primarily with international patrons who do not appreciate the extended delay in business dealings during Chinese 
holidays. To accommodate this, in addition to shortening the May holiday, the government extended the New Year 
holiday, and added three new traditional holidays to the list of national holidays. 
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had generated 18.1 billion yuan during the Labor Day holiday, with nearly 40 million citizens 
engaging in domestic holiday tourism and travel.55  Weeks before the second “Golden Week” of 
that same year, the central government encouraged local government offices and party branches 
to enhance their efforts at stimulating consumption in their localities by promoting holiday 
travel.56  
 In contrast with the annual Spring Festival mass-migration, when members of all social 
strata, some of whom must save significant portions of their income all year, take pains to 
journey to their hometowns to visit relatives and friends, welcoming the new year giving and 
receiving feasts and gifts in accordance with their various local customs, the “Golden Week” 
holidays were designed specifically to compel the financially-advantaged to spend. Or, to put it 
in terms of the 1990s public sentiment, the successful, aspiring “middle-class” members of 
society were expected to spread their money far and wide, and to enjoy the benefits of the 
expanse of commodities offered by the new, globally competitive market. From street-level 
getihu, small businesses, restaurants and convenience shops, to internationally-branded 
department stores of the urban arena, each saw first-hand the economic benefits of the extended 
holidays.  
 
3.5 “Middle-Class Tastes” as Embodiment of Suzhi  
                                                     
55 Pun Ngai, p. 472. 
56 As cited in Pun (2003), p. 473: “Vice-Premier Qian Qichen today asked all government departments and localities 
to increase cooperation in a bid to push holiday tourism to a new high. At the first ministerial coordination meeting 
for national holiday tourism, Qian said the coordination meeting system, authorized by the State Council, will 
announce tourism information and deal with major transportation, security and emergency rescue work during the 
tourism peak season. The vice-premier asked all departments and localities to take immediate steps to make tourism 
play a bigger role in boosting domestic demand, stimulating consumption, and restructuring the economy.” 
"Ministerial Cooperation Calls for Holiday Tourism," Xinhua News, August 26, 2000, p. 473. 
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 Beyond the increase in profit margins resulting from the holidays spending frenzies, 
further culturally significant phenomena began to solidify across the nation. The shift from 
production to consumption as national priority imbued the (urban) masses with a sense of both 
duty and pride in their ability to make money and showcase their ability to do so by 
accumulating goods and pursuing leisure for a price. In the more affluent urban areas, the 
showcasing of wealth manifested in wearing high-end, international brand-name clothing and 
accessories, purchasing private cars for personal use, enrolling in foreign language courses at 
increasingly high rates of tuition, paying for musical and artistic courses, and, as their incomes 
allowed, buying single-family apartments with modern conveniences such as private kitchens 
and bathrooms.  
 By the end of the extended Labor Day holiday of 2001, the Guangzhou Xinhua news 
outlet identified a new trend in the spending habits of urban consumers. In addition to taking 
advantage of the dizzying array of shopping opportunities and fine dining, urbanites were 
increasingly developing “more sophisticated cultural tastes (wenhua wei/文化味).” These 
“sophisticated cultural tastes” included “engaging in the leisure-time activities of going to the 
cinema, visiting exhibitions, and attending seminars.”57 The “Golden Weeks” afforded the 
privileged citizens social permission to publicly satisfy their own desires by means of their 
private wealth, something which had been socially (and politically) unacceptable less than a few 
decades prior. The “middle-class” had, by the end of the end of the 20th century, become an 
identifiable social group, based on the material markers of common consumer tastes, though 
such tastes were attributed to the “human-quality” achieved through education and refined 
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character cultivation.58 These “middle-class” consumer tastes, during the late 1990s period of 
reform-era China, had come to exemplify the meaning of “modernity” in the social 
consciousness. In the few years after the turn of the century, such consumer tastes and their 
seamless transition towards “sophisticated culture,” seeking leisure through cultural, historical, 
and intellectual curiosities, laid the groundwork for a gradual shift in what it meant to be, or be 
seen as, a person of “quality” in 21st century China. 
 The rural citizens, including the migrant workers residing in the urban areas but officially 
and inextricably tied to their rural roots, were not in the same financial position as many of their 
urban counterparts. However, they were nonetheless fully included in the social transformation 
to a consumer society. Inundated with slogans emphasizing the imperative of modernization, 
simultaneously ashamed and excited by the images, via advertisements in every medium 
available, portraying the luxuries enjoyed by the urbanites, each promoting and celebrating the 
success of economic modernization, and the social respect earned by those who spend their 
money (to build the nation and bring it out of “backwardness,”) rural Chinese became acutely 
aware of their own inadequacy. Striving to be seen as valuable members of New China, that is as 
consumers instead of lowly producers, once touted as the backbone of Chinese society during the 
Mao years, young rural men and women, by ever greater numbers, sought to escape their rural 
communities, and thus leave behind the socially-ascribed culturally-backward rural identities.59 
Equating urbanity with modernity and development, unprecedented numbers of rural men and 
                                                     
58 Hai Ren, “The Neoliberal State and Risk Society,” pp. 115-120; also see Pun Ngai, “Subsumption or 
Consumption,” pp. 471-75; also see Hanlong Lu, “To Be Relatively Comfortable in an Egalitarian Society,” in 
Deborah S. Davis, ed., The Consumer Revolution in Urban China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000), p. 120-125, for a brief discussion of the official designation of “middle-class” in 1990’s China. 
59 Yan Hairong, “Neoliberal Governmentality,” p.501-503. Yan estimates that in Anhui alone, the early 1990’s saw 
an uptick of 100 million migrant laborers pour in as a result of urban industrialization and privatization. 
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women abandoned their fields to find work in the industrialized zones.60 Many did so with the 
explicit hope that the income gained, regardless of the exceedingly difficult labor conditions, 
would provide them with the financial means to consume in the way the urban “others” did, 
redecorate themselves with modern fashions, send home new commodities to their families left 
behind, and, especially, to attain for themselves the high level of “quality” so pervasively 
associated with urban life.   
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Chapter Four: Mainstreaming “suzhi” in Public Discourse 
4.1 Education Reforms: Suzhi Jiaoyu (Education for Quality)  
 Within the larger context of modernization and development, the rise of consumerism 
and the concomitant establishment of a distinctly “middle-class” marked a quantifiable success 
of the reform period in establishing a sound base for the continued growth of economic capital. 
Liberating production from the confines of the command economy allowed for increases in 
production, revenue, and quality of products as a result of market competition. The next phase of 
reform and development, designed to enhance the quality and stability of the economic base, was 
to focus on the advancement of the human capital on which economic capital was generated. To 
enhance the quality of China’s productive forces, reformers turned to the education system and 
the term suzhi became a public sensation/buzzword at the turn of the 21st century.61  
 In mid-1999, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State 
Council issued "A Resolution to Deepen Education Reform and Push Forward Suzhi Education 
on All Fronts,” stating: 
In today's world, science and technology are progressing by leaps and bounds; a 
knowledge economy [zhishi jingji] is emerging; global competition for national strength 
is increasingly fierce. Education is fundamental to the comprehensive formation of 
national strength, which is increasingly measured by the suzhi of workers and on the 
development of a talented human resources pool. This places a more urgent demand on 
educating and training the new generation for the 21st century.62  
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News, June 17, 1999. 
41 
 
According to the resolution, both educational infrastructure and pedagogy needed urgent reform 
in order to "meet the need for improving the quality of the national population [guomin suzhi/国
民素质]."63  
 Drawing on models from developed countries and western pedagogy, proponents of 
education reform sought to transform the Chinese educational system from one based on 
memorization and examination to one that fostered the development of a variety of suzhi 
competencies through a student-centered curriculum. It was believed that the success of 
developed countries was due, in part, to the comprehensive-education models practiced in those 
countries. Such comprehensive models were thought to foster creativity, independence, life-
skills, and emotional/social intelligence in young students, traits that were deemed necessary for 
success in a competitive and increasingly global economy. Such skills were seen to be lacking in 
China’s population. Education reformers blamed the heavy reliance on exam-oriented education 
(yingshi jiaoyu/应试教育) as the culprit responsible for producing “low-suzhi” workers.  
 Preparing the nation for greater capacity to generate innovators and responsible citizens, 
the academy of social sciences pushed the agenda of educational reforms and laid out a new 
pedagogy aimed at ameliorating the suzhi deficiency. Translated into English as education for 
quality, or quality-oriented education, suzhi jiaoyu  (素质教育), as the new model was called, 
included in the curriculum courses and measurements for developing physical suzhi (shenti 
suzhi/身体素质), psychological suzhi (xinli suzhi/心理素质), ideological/political suzhi (sixiang 
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suzhi/思想素质), as Education Minister Zhou Ji explained, in order to “make real improvements 
in the physical health, psychological suzhi and artistic accomplishment of students and foster a 
new generation of well-rounded people developed in morals, intellect, physical health and 
aesthetic appreciation.”64 
 Drawing on western models of “comprehensive education,” suzhi jiaoyu sought to reform 
the educational curriculum to a “well-rounded education” system that would develop the specific 
categories of suzhi laid out in the scientific research of the population planners. These 
pedagogical reforms included the implementation of physical education, aesthetic appreciation 
(music and art), world history, geography, creative thinking and problem solving techniques, the 
re-introduction of “social models” as educational tools, and the inclusion of “self-ethical/moral 
evaluation” for children to incorporate into their educational regimen.65  Suzhi jiaoyu became the 
official guiding pedagogical model in 1999, though only implemented at key experimental 
schools as pilot programs during its first few years.66 
 Debates surrounding education reforms circulated in the national media, from scholars, 
government officials, talk radio hosts, and social psychologists prompted a resurgence of public 
discourse concerning the meaning and means of suzhi, the notion of “raising quality” became the 
hot topic as parents and educators grappled with the idea that student success would possibly no 
longer be defined by exam scores alone, but would be evaluated based on a mastery of their 
overall suzhi, instead. Despite the stated intentions of reducing reliance on exam scores as the 
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sole criterion for assessing student achievement, the education reformers had not yet devised a 
way to measure academic achievement as reliably as examination scores had. The result was a 
formally adopted curriculum geared towards the cultivation of suzhi yet still reliant on 
matriculation by examination. The concept of raising the “quality” of the country’s youth, 
though still only vaguely understood, entered the very private consciousness of individual 
households as a matter of urgent priority. Parents seeking desperately to provide their only child 
with the opportunity to develop high-suzhi and secure access to the academic credentials 
necessary to find gainful employment and respectable status later in life now felt an 
overwhelming pressure to supplement their child’s formal education with extra-curricular 
training.  
  
4.2 Self-cultivation and National strength 
 The education reforms aimed at raising the quality of China’s children through a 
“comprehensive education” brought in their wake a renewed emphasis on the role of the family 
in cultivating “quality” in the home. How to raise a child’s suzhi, and thus effectively compete in 
both school and society, however, was vague and undefined, and was a question of great 
importance. In the early years of the 21st century, a new genre of suzhi raising guidebooks hit the 
market with immense popularity.67 One of the first of its kind, the parenting guide/personal 
memoir titled Harvard Girl, Liu Yiting: A True Cronicle of Suzhi Cultivation (Hafo nuhai, Liu 
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Yiting: suzhi peiyang jishi/哈佛女孩， 留亦婷：素质培养纪实), sold over 1.75 million copies 
in its first printing, and detailed the painstaking efforts Yiting’s parents made to cultivate the 
necessary qualities and habits in her that would ultimately win her a full-ride scholarship to the 
prestigious Harvard University. From excursions to the poverty-stricken countryside for cultural 
awareness development, to pinching ice-cubes to develop perseverance in the face of pain and 
hardship, the book chronicled Liu Yiting’s life as a child of correct suzhi investment, and 
provided a model from which other parents could learn. Parenting guides, successful student 
memoirs, hand-books on child-psychology, detailed lists of “quality” markers and their 
corresponding habits, and translated biographies of international business and political elite all 
became sensational best-sellers, especially among the child-rearing, aspiring young professional, 
and university student demographics.68  
 Raising the quality of individuals was not only a matter of private responsibility, but, as 
articulated in popular media by the public intellectual Jie Sizhong, it was an urgent task of the 
nation as an international player. 69  After China’s entrance to the World Trade Organization in 
2001, the notion of “market competition” gained a greater significance in the public mind. In his 
popular book The Quality Crisis of our Nation, he recalled the “century of humiliation” China 
had faced during the period from the demise of the last dynasty to the rise of Communist China. 
Jie invoked images of past humiliations by outside actors and national failure to compete with 
modernized nations and blamed these failings on the widespread lack of individual cultivation 
among the populace. His analysis of China’s “suzhi crisis” was stated in terms of national 
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quality.”  
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strength and the ability to compete economically and intellectually in the international arena. In 
his interpretation, raising suzhi was not only a matter of moral development or domestic 
modernization, but the guarantee of national survival among nations. He emphasized that the 
“quality of individuals” equated to the quality of institutions, and the institutions served as the 
backbone of strength and a deterrent to hegemonic states seeking to subdue China’s rise.    
 What became clear for Jie’s readers was that “quality” was not inborn nor was it gained 
simply by exposure to advantageous environmental conditions. Parents of only-children needed 
to foster the growth of “quality” from day-one, inculcating them with habits and skills that would 
provide them with a competitive edge in society. The phenomenon known as “Tiger Mom,” and 
the positive and negative reactions to the stereotypical “Chinese-style” parenting described in the 
various success stories of high-achieving children was a direct social response to the “suzhi-
raising” consciousness aroused by suzhi jiaoyu discourse.  
 How to raise high-achieving, high-“quality” children, the hot topic of the first decade of 
the 2000s, quickly transitioned into a discourse of social responsibility and the alleged behavioral 
degeneration of China’s “spoiled” single-children. Theories postulated that the over-emphasis on 
educational achievement at the expense of socializing experiences had created a generation of 
little Emperors and princesses who were selfish, driven primarily by material gain, and that this 
phenomenon had taken a detrimental toll on Chinese society. Reports by child psychologists 
claimed that Chinese single-children lacked emotional intelligence, regardless of how highly 
they scored on academic exams, and this emotional intelligence, officially termed psychological 
suzhi, was a key component not only of business success, but was also essential to the stability 
and progress of the entire society.  
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 Incorporating suzhi development into the national educational curriculum effectively 
linked notions of nation building, modernization and development, together with parental 
responsibility and family governance. Within suzhi jiaoyu rhetoric, parents and teachers of 
primary school children were responsible for developing their own suzhi so as to become proper 
models for the nation’s youth. The shift in suzhi discourse from economic development and 
technical training to moral cultivation and emotional intelligence contributed to a modified 
definition of “human quality” in the following decade. An educated person who was capable of 
participating in the modernization and development of Chinese society came to be imagined as a 
person who embodied physical health, psychological acuity, ideological soundness, civic duty, 






Chapter Five: Suzhi Today 
5.1 Harmonizing Society and “Putting the People First”  
 In the 1930s, one of early modern China’s most renowned sociologists, Fei Xiaotong, 
discussed in a series of publications the conditions inherent in Chinese society that engendered 
selfish, “egocentric,” behavior.70 Although the first decade of the 21st century brought with it 
several events worthy of national pride, from China’s entrance to the World Trade Organization 
in 2001, hosting the Olympic games in 2008, to becoming the World’s second-largest economy 
(surpassing Japan) in 2010, the celebratory mood was seriously dampened by several reminders 
of the very egocentric society Fei had spoken of so many years before.  
 The advancements in industry, education, and overall standards of living, as well as the 
vast improvements in infrastructure development, all of which were previously held to be 
essential to raising the “quality” of the nation’s people, proved to have little effect on the social 
behavior of individuals. Drastic changes in the management of the state and sustained economic 
growth had done very little to alter the fundamental nature of Chinese society. 
 Egocentric behavior and its detriments became the focal point of the “suzhi-conscious” 
discourse. Fei’s analysis, which was not intended to be a revolutionary treatise on the 
backwardness of traditional culture, rested on an empirical understanding of the historically 
embedded nature of the selfishness intrinsic to the Chinese mode of social relations. Consistent 
with Fei’s evaluation of Chinese society being a complex web of self-centered networks of 
relations, suzhi discourse turned its focus on the responsibility of the individual to behave in a 
manner that corrects the social group to which it is linked, which, in the case of “human quality” 
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discourse, refers to the entire nation of Chinese people. The emphasis of suzhi returned to an 
essentially classical Chinese conception of the ultimate importance of individual moral 
correctness in social relations. In the 21st century, relations were no longer defined in the 
Confucian terms of the Five Primary Relationships within the social hierarchy, but they were still 
understood in terms of the fundamental principle that the consequences of individual actions 
generate outward to affect the entire web of relations, constituting the entirety of the state. 
The development of a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui/和谐社会) became part of the 
official slogan under the Hu Jintao administration during 2002 to 2012. The slogan put forth the 
notion that social stability and social-moral accountability were inextricably linked, and stressed 
the need to improve the moral quality (daode suzhi/道德素质) of the nation’s people.  Hu’s 
transition to moral “quality” and the development of a “harmonious society” marked an apparent 
departure from the previous decades’ reform policies by “putting the people first,” as opposed to 
focusing on the primacy of economic development.71 The concept of “harmony” referred not to 
an absence of conflict, but to the traditional Chinese understanding of harmony, a society ordered 
by morality (daode/道德) and propriety (li/礼) between and among individuals of differentiated, 
polarized, and stratified social networks. 72  Moral education in primary and secondary schools 
was emphasized through the ongoing suzhi jiaoyu reforms, stressing the importance of charity, 
hard work, honesty, and good deeds as measures of “quality.” Harmony, in the Hu 
administration, was aimed at developing a set of social norms that could simultaneously unite the 
                                                     
71 “Communique from the 6th Plenary Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party 16th Central Committee” 
(Zhongguo Gongchandang di Shiliu Jie Zhongyang Weiyuanhui di liu ci Quanti Huiyi Gongbao), Xinhua News 
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economically and intellectually disparate urban and rural masses into a cohesive whole, and 
provide a public framework for orderly self-regulation in the chaotic environment of institutional 
change and unprecedented international integration. 
 In 2008, the country’s leadership provided a clear and very public pronouncement to the 
Chinese nation, in fact, to the entire world, that the pride of Chinese culture and the foundation 
of harmony is rooted in Confucian ethics. For the majority of the CPC’s tenure, Confucian 
ideology was derided as a harmful remnant of China’s feudal past, and was a fundamental cause 
of the country’s failure to modernize during the 20th century. Now, in the year 2008, in what 
commentators around the world called a most spectacular and stunning performance, the 
production of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games, purportedly watched by 
more simultaneous viewers than any Olympic games in history, entirely omitted any mention or 
display of Communist ideology or “Red” history, and instead celebrated the harmonizing 
principles and wisdom in Confucian teachings.73 The awe-inspiring opening ceremony 
celebrated China’s 5,000 years of history and contributions to global society, and included an 
elaborately choreographed tribute to Confucius, with thousands of perfectly ordered participants 
reciting in unison more than a dozen well-known, culturally significant proverbs attributed to the 
ancient philosopher. These proverbs highlighted the civilizing effects of education, discipline, 
self-cultivation, neighborliness, and propriety. The Party/State’s inclusion of these proverbs in 
the extraordinarily public statement of the opening ceremony indicates the weight that they 
wished to place on them for both domestic and international audiences. 
                                                     
73 “Beijing Olympics Draw Largest Ever Global TV Audience,” Nielson, 09-05-2008. URL: 
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5.2 The Moral Crisis of the Nation 
 Amid numerous scandals among the ranks of business, party, and government elite, now 
visible to the masses in greater frequency and detail (though sometimes only very briefly), 
thanks to the widespread availability of internet and smartphone use in the early 2000s, the 
public began to pay greater attention to the social ills plaguing the nation at all levels of society.  
 Despite the proud achievements of China occurring on the world’s stage, domestic 
discussions of the Chinese people’s suzhi, especially those that focused on the behavioral 
indicators of low-suzhi, increased dramatically in the aftermath of several disturbing events at the 
end of the first decade of the 21st century. Although there were surely numerous localized events 
that produced internet debates over the low-suzhi of the protagonists, the few events mentioned 
below generated nationwide, even global, responses evaluating the apparent “moral depravity” of 
post-socialist China, and serve well to highlight the larger social ills that seem to have played an 
important role in the shift in suzhi interpretation to how it is understood and used in everyday 
speech today.  
 On a broad scale, public trust in the judicial system of the PRC has never been 
particularly high, mostly on account of weaknesses in the structural design that invite corruption 
and incompetence.74 Reforms in the legal system in recent years have been geared toward 
generating a greater public faith in the impartiality and overall competence of judges, a stronger 
system of laws and consistency in enforcement, and a better appreciation for the rule of law.75 
However, one particular case in 2007 managed to highlight the basic flaws of the legal system 
                                                     
74 For a detailed and comprehensive overview of China’s legal system, systemic challenges, and public opinion, see 
Randall Perenboom’s China’s Long March toward the Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 
(2002). 
75 Perenboom, China’s Long March (2002), pp. 450-512. 
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while simultaneously showcasing one of the most pervasive moral issues of contemporary China. 
In late 2006, in Nanjing City of Jiangsu province, an elderly woman was knocked over, or fell 
over, while trying to board a public bus. Elbowing, shoving, and jostling are commonplace as 
crowds of people attempt to board and exit busses at the same time, but on that day, the elderly 
woman lost her balance, fell to the ground, and injured her hip. Unable to get up, a young man 
went to her aid. He helped her get up, call her family, and took her to the hospital. He even 
provided her a bit of money to help pay for the hospital costs. Later, however, the elderly woman 
sued the young man who helped her get up, claiming that it was he who had knocked her down 
and injured her.76 She filed suit, and although there was no evidence that the young man was 
responsible for the woman’s fall, the court ruled in her favor, requiring the man to pay several 
thousand yuan for damages and fees. The court’s ruling stated that this man’s helping a complete 
stranger was illogical and against common sense, thus he must be guilty.77 According to the 
judgement, “common sense” was that only a guilty person would offer help to a stranger in this 
situation. If Peng was innocent and merely witnessed the woman lying on the ground, he would 
have no compelling reason to help her like he did.  
 The public response to the Peng-Yu case was one of disgust and outrage. Some pointed to 
the fact that the judge ruled against Peng without evidence, highlighting one of the many 
shortcomings of the legal system. Others pointed out that the precedent set by this case would 
scare people in the future from helping others for fear of being sued. Others, however, saw a 
bigger problem with the case and its outcome, one that seemed to be more indicative of deeper 
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social problems than the possible aftermath of the case itself. The judge presiding over the case 
followed basic protocol in adjudication, but lacking hard evidence on either side, he based his 
judgement on what he understood as the prevailing norm in society - the way most people would 
act in this situation. The judge’s appeal to “common sense” was based on what he saw as 
common practice - people in this society do not help strangers unless there is an ulterior motive. 
Commentators picked up on the “common” element and lamented that although it was true that 
the case may be decisive in the future in deterring acts of kindness, the very “commonness” of 
ignoring others in need is the greater shame that needed remedy. The selfish mentality had 
become so pervasive that it had now become considered the social norm and was being legally 
sanctioned as rational behavior. These urban people, educated and “modern,” seemed to have 
lost all sense of compassion for their fellow beings. To lack compassion is to lack one of the 
most fundamental qualities of being “human,” at least as it had been understood in Chinese 
society until very recently.  
 Another major public incident, which shocked the nation and effectively linked China’s 
perceived moral-crisis with “quality” discourse, is the case of Little YueYue.78 In Foshan, 
Guangdong province in 2011, the two-year-old girl, Wang Yue (王悦) had wandered out of her 
mother’s sight for a short time while her mother was quickly collecting hanging laundry before a 
storm. The toddler wandered into the nearby street and was struck by a van, first by the front 
tires, and a moment later, by the rear tires as the driver pulled forward. Shortly after being struck 
by the first driver, another van drove over her body, crushing her legs. The first driver knew he 
had struck the little girl before deciding to pull forward, but he also knew that the fines he would 
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have to pay for her hospital bills would be much higher than the fines he would have to pay for 
her death. A financial calculation motivated the driver of the van to pull forward and crush the 
little girl’s already broken body under the weight of his rear tires. Beyond the callousness of the 
driver’s actions, an equally disturbing fact, shown in video footage of the entire incident online, 
was that no less than 18 people witnessed the girl wander into the street, watched her get struck 
by both vans and lie bleeding on the ground, and not a single one attempted to help her until it 
was far too late.  
 In response to the death of that young girl, thousands of online commentators made 
known their disgust with modern society and the undeniable selfishness and moral decay it has 
brought to the Chinese people. The incident spurred extensive debates about the lack of 
motivation to help others and the low moral quality of the unhelpful bystanders. Some expressed 
sorrow for the mother of the young girl, yet cited the 2007 Peng-Yu case and others like it, where 
those who take action to help strangers are punished, to justify the inaction of the onlookers.79  
 
5.3 Civilized Behavior and Social Etiquette   
 In 2012, the same year I returned to China, Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as the leader 
of China. Shortly after his accession to paramount leadership, he launched a multi-pronged 
campaign to clean out the “bad elements” that had grown out of the past decades of reform and 
development. The campaign sought to eradicate corruption within the ranks of the Communist 
party, strengthen the legal system and public faith in the rule of law, curb environmental damage 
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27, 2011. Accessed on 1/23/2016. URL: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-10-27/000423367798.shtml.  
54 
 
caused by industrialization, and enhance social stability through intensified efforts in public 
moral education via the construction of “civilized cities.”80 President Xi further promoted his 
predecessor’s agenda of building a “harmonious society” through reform policies by declaring 
the importance of traditional Confucian morality as the fundamental basis of Chinese civilization 
and social ideals. 
 In President Xi’s 2014 speech at the Opening Ceremony of the International Conference 
in Commemoration of the 2,565th Anniversary of Confucius' Birth, he stated 
“Confucianism… emphasized giving play to culture’s educational and enlightening 
functions in cultivating fine personalities, and combined the cultivation of individuals’ 
and society’s moral qualities with management of state affairs, fulfilling the goal of 
mutually complementing and mutually facilitating interaction…. Meanwhile, 
contemporary human beings face such outstanding problems as widening wealth gaps, 
endless greed for materialistic satisfaction and luxury, unrestrained extreme 
individualism, continuous decline of social credit, ever-degrading ethics, and increasing 
tension between man and Nature.” 
The solution, he explained, seemed to lie in the traditional culture of China and Confucian 
teachings that espoused 
“persistent self-improvement and cultivation of profound moral characters worthy of rich 
material reward… governing with moral principles and uprightness, of perpetual 
reform, …loving others and upholding moral principles, of treating people with sincerity, 
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and fostering rapport by upholding good faith, …being frugal and faithful to moral 
principles and adopting strict self-discipline against extravagance,… restraint and 
appropriateness….”  
He concluded that the “educational values and moral instructions in the fine cultural heritages of 
the Chinese nation offer useful inspirations for understanding and transforming the world, 
handling state affairs, and improving society’s moral wellbeing.”81 Under the Xi administration, 
the behaviors that mark a city, town, village, district, school, or work-unit as civilized (wenming/
文明) are synonymous with the “quality” of individuals who make up the collective, which thus 
marks the collective as one of high or low suzhi. Civilized behaviors include practicing good 
table manners, queuing in line, picking up trash from the road, speaking and eating quietly, being 
charitable and courteous, and showing respect and care for children, the elderly, and the less-
privileged members of society.  
 
5.4 Embodying suzhi  
 Over the course of two years, from 2012 to 2014, I engaged in multiple conversations 
with Chinese citizens from all walks of life, discussing their interpretations of suzhi.82 This view 
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that behavior is the ultimate indicator of one’s “quality” was echoed by my Chinese conversation 
partners on countless occasions. When I asked my acquaintances to explain suzhi in general 
terms, I often received generic responses that either tried to translate the word into English (as 
“quality” or “civilized”) or simplify the concept’s meaning along the lines of “it just means to be 
a good person.” On other occasions, I heard that suzhi “is mostly about education and culture 
(wenhua/文化).” However, when I received generic definitions, a little prodding elicited a list of 
behaviors that were considered to be indicative of low-suzhi, and a description of behaviors and 
etiquette that were associated with higher levels of suzhi. Low-suzhi behaviors were described as 
manners and behaviors that make others feel uncomfortable, disgusted, frustrated, or otherwise 
upset.  
 Examples of low-“quality” behaviors, given by nearly all of my conversation partners, 
regardless of their individual background or current socio-economic position, included: crowding 
and jostling rather than standing in line; blocking the flow of traffic in public places; speaking 
loudly or shouting in public; jaywalking; smoking in non-smoking areas; not offering one’s seat 
to pregnant, disabled, or elderly; spitting on the ground or floor; and eating loudly. Such 
examples may seem like trivial annoyances one encounters from time to time, but as nearly any 
Chinese person would attest, these behaviors are ubiquitous across China. Precisely because the 
above-mentioned behaviors are so common, the fact that suzhi discourse categorizes them as 
indicators of “low-quality” consequently suggests that raising one’s own “quality” requires one 
                                                     
night-market hawkers, hotel maids, house cleaners, bike mechanics, bartenders, etc. The conversations were not 
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to alter what is very much a social norm and standard practice. Furthermore, the justification for 
considering such behaviors as markers of “low-quality” was summarized in one conversation 
with a taxi driver who had migrated from rural Anhui province as: “those people [who do such 
things] have low-suzhi because they are not concerned about how their behavior affects other 
people. It is a kind of selfishness and not civilized.” 
 In discussing indicators of high-suzhi, the examples provided a clear connection between 
“quality” and social etiquette, and between “civilized behavior” (wenming xingwei/文明行为) 
and social benefit. In the contemporary logic of suzhi, “high quality” behaviors not only benefit 
the individual actor, but also benefit the surrounding community through the promotion of 
exemplary behavior. Examples of “high-quality” or “civilized” behaviors were not limited to 
simple the inverse of “low-quality” behaviors, instead, indicators of one’s high level of suzhi 
reflected a high level of emotional intelligence, empathy towards one’s fellow beings, concern 
for the environment and one’s own physical health, and altruistic kindness towards strangers. A 
common refrain was to quote a well-known proverb of Confucius, known to the world as the 
“golden rule,” that one should not do to others what one would not like done to oneself.  
 In one of my evening English Conversation courses, I led a discussion on the topic of 
suzhi, and asked my students to discuss their understanding of the term in English. One student 
in the class, who was also a graduate student at Nanjing University of Science and Technology, 
described the “high-suzhi” of a classmate by relating a story about the patience and kindness her 
classmate showed to various people on the way to class. She described an event that proved her 
classmate’s “quality.” Shortly after setting off to school, she and her classmate were approached 
by a young man handing out flyers with discount coupons for a nearby restaurant. “Typical 
behavior,” she said “would be to ignore him [the person handing out flyers] and keep walking. 
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No one wants to carry that trash [the flyer] all the way, and besides, those people are everywhere. 
If you stop and let them talk about the promotion, you’ll never get to where you’re going and 
you’ll end up with a load of useless paper trash!” Her classmate, however, did stop for the young 
man and receive his flyer. “He even smiled at him and said ‘thank you.’ That alone was a good 
example [of high-suzhi]!” She then explained that her classmate was approached three more 
times by different advertisers during the same journey, and each time he accepted the flyer, 
smiled, and said ‘thank you,’ without ever commenting on the annoyance of being stopped. He 
carried the flyers with his book-bag until they reached the school building, then casually found a 
trash bin and discarded the flyers. She concluded that “at first, I didn’t understand why he would 
be so nice to them, but I thought about it and realized that his kindness probably made them feel 
respected, and maybe even made them feel like their work was successful that day. That kind of 
feeling is important for everybody.”  
 From this student’s observation of her classmate’s behavior, she began to analyze her 
own suzhi in terms of how her behavior might make others feel. “I started to notice small things 
that I do that might make people feel badly in their daily life- like when the cleaner (ayi/阿姨) is 
mopping the floor and I step my dirty shoes on the white tiles, or when I get in the taxi and I 
don’t say hello to the driver- just tell him the location and sit quietly- these kinds of things can 
make people feel small.” Her reasoning was that if her own actions caused others to feel badly, 
then her own suzhi was not high. In order to raise her personal “quality,” she began keeping a 
journal of “uncivilized habits” (bu wenming de xiguan/不文明的习惯), and contemplating how 
to correct them.  
 The other participants in the English Conversation class listening to this story of “high 
quality” behavior agreed with this student’s assessment of the importance of kindness as a 
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measure of suzhi. They added to the conversation by sharing their own experiences of the 
beneficial effects of kindness, politeness, and helpfulness. Another student added that “some 
people think suzhi is about how much money and education you have, but it isn’t about that. 
There are plenty of very rich people and some even have high [educational] degrees, but they 
still have very low suzhi.” The group discussed suzhi as a process of self-cultivation by which 
individuals learn to be conscientious members of society and conduct themselves with proper 
etiquette in different social environments.   
 For my students in the evening English courses, as well as many others with whom I 
spoke on the topic of suzhi, people considered to be “high-quality” not only abstain from the 
types of “low-quality” behaviors mentioned above, but also understand that their individual 
behaviors can affect the “quality” of society around them. Just as the student’s story above 
illustrated, the kindness shown to strangers by her classmate not only gave the advertisement 
distributers a momentary sense of job-satisfaction and respectability, but also played a decisive 
role in effecting a positive change  in the narrator’s own behavior and social outlook. If more 
people practiced behaviors associated with “high quality,” more people would benefit from the 
outward civilizing effect, and the “low-quality” behaviors would become less and less common. 
This view echoes both the Confucian notion of the social benefit of self-cultivation and propriety 
and also reflects the degree to which the concept of suzhi in the minds of average citizens 




Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks 
 Since the term suzhi first appeared in the Family Planning policy propaganda in 1979, its 
usage and meaning has been steered by top-down reform efforts. Though vaguely defined, the 
term has been used as both a justification for and an end goal of policies that have had profound 
effects on the whole of Chinese society.  In the first two decades of the reform-era, the use and 
meaning of suzhi coincided with the primary political agenda of national development through 
economic growth. The Family Planning Policy expressed suzhi as a broad concept of physical 
well-being that would result from a smaller population and access to resources. The restructuring 
of the command economy through gradual decollectivization and marketization, designed to 
stimulate economic growth, promoted suzhi as something that could be gained by successful 
market competition and accumulation of private wealth. The heavy emphasis on scientific and 
technological development as a means to succeed in the emerging market endowed suzhi with 
connotations of prestige through intellectual accomplishment. The celebration of consumerism 
and the “sophisticated tastes” of the new “middle-class” in the 1990s and early 2000s 
conceptualized suzhi as something that could be sought through material markers and 
consumption habits. The education reforms at the turn of the century equated suzhi with 
academic merit, whereby one could gain “quality” by investing heavily in education and extra-
curricular training. After the first decade of the 21st century, the political emphasis on “harmony” 
and the imperatives of “civilized” behavior of individuals established the framework through 
which suzhi is understood today, a social ideal based on the transformational power of morality 




 Given the variety of contexts out of which suzhi discourse has grown over the last 40 
years, it is unsurprising that western scholars have found it difficult to translate or define 
concretely in English. In my own quest to understand the meaning of “human quality” as it is 
expressed by the term suzhi, I found that average Chinese citizens of today’s society also found it 
difficult to define, yet they all seemed to accept the basic premise on which the political suzhi 
discourse is based, that the Chinese nation lacks adequate suzhi, and that cultivating suzhi is in 
the best interest of each individual as well as society as a whole. Beyond the acceptance of the 
basic premise as a kind of “common sense,” I found that many people with whom I spoke about 
the meaning of suzhi did not entirely reject the official framing of the term as being associated 
with wealth, education, and material comfort. However, the vast majority of my acquaintances 
believed that one’s suzhi is primarily determined by one’s behaviors and social etiquette. The 
logic that my Chinese counterparts imparted to me reflects the most recent official discourse on 
the imperative of improving the moral quality of the citizenry and the regulation of social 
behaviors in accordance with traditional Chinese thought. The congruity between grassroots 
interpretations of suzhi and the dominant political propaganda illustrates the efficacy of reform 
rhetoric through the use of suzhi as a method to guide public participation in the national 
development process.  
 Although top-down drives for suzhi-building are based on an economic/market 
foundation, ordinary individual interpretations of what suzhi means, how it is manifested, and 
how to get it can be more closely categorized as in line with traditional Confucian thought than 
with a neoliberal social order. While modern western scholars tend to tie together the aims of the 
state with the behaviors of individual actors in society, connecting the two without reference to 
longer-standing social/cultural traditions (traditionally accepted norm/beliefs) overlooks both the 
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importance of the individual in the overall shaping of the reality of society, as well as the 
influence of the past on the present, which is now being reflected in political discourse in terms 
of suzhi. This research finds that individuals have internalized the concept of suzhi as a cultural 
continuity, reflecting traditional philosophies of social ethics and interpersonal relations. Political 
discourse throughout the Reform era seems to have provided the people with a rubric for 
understanding suzhi, and the meanings associated with the term have been internalized and built 
upon as metrics of “quality” that coincide with the evolving needs of society within the process 
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